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Abstract 
This paper presents methodology, experience and practical 
outcomes of the risk assessment-based revision of Loss-Of-
Mains (LOM) protection settings in NIE Networks’ 
distribution system. An investigative project has been 
undertaken by the authors to revise the current LOM practice 
as recommended by the G59/1/NI regulation, and to propose 
the settings which would meet the all-Ireland transmission 
system stability criteria. It is also important to ensure that any 
increased personal risk is realistically quantified and satisfies 
the Health and Safety requirements. Both aspects (i.e. LOM 
protection stability and sensitivity) are covered in the paper. 
The results and observations included in the paper aim to 
provide the means and supporting evidence for achieving best 
compromise in the revision of LOM protection settings.  
1 Introduction 
The LOM protection has been the subject of much debate in 
recent years. When it was originally introduced, LOM was 
designed to reliably detect and promptly disconnect any 
distributed generation (DG) in the islanded part of the 
network to prevent human safety hazards or damage to 
generators due to out-of-phase reclosure. The priority 
requirements were high detection sensitivity and fast 
operation. Occasional spurious tripping of LOM protection 
was not considered an issue due to low penetration levels of 
DG. However, the continuing rapid growth of the 
distribution-connected generation and the decrease of 
transmission system inertia with consequently higher 
frequency dynamics, has shifted the perspective on LOM 
protection dramatically. Spurious operation is no longer 
acceptable and adequate levels of LOM protection security 
need to be maintained to prevent disconnection of large 
amounts of DG during system wide-events. Although there 
are other solutions to address this issue (e.g. direct 
intertripping), the majority are too costly and/or complex to 
implement retrospectively. Therefore, the first logical step in 
addressing this critical problem is to enhance the security of 
the existing LOM protection by relaxing (i.e. increasing) the 
settings. 
 
The paper contains three main parts. In the first stage the need 
for change is presented with focus on operational experience 
and theoretical analysis. The LOM protection security is 
addressed by analysing Rate Of Change Of Frequency 
(ROCOF) and voltage Vector Shift (VS) protection 
performance under the worst-case scenario frequency 
transients derived using dynamic simulations. Moreover, a 
number of faults records (captured during actual network 
incidents) are used to provide an additional realistic insight 
into the LOM protection performance in the vicinity of a 
fault. The stability performance results presented in the paper 
have been performed under a variety of setting alternatives to 
identify viable options for the LOM settings revision. 
 
In the second stage, a risk tree based probability analysis is 
employed to estimate potential increase in personal risk as 
well as the risk of generator damage under the LOM settings 
established during the stability analysis. This is to ensure that 
the elevated risk levels due to the relaxation of the settings 
remain with the Health and Safety Executive’s acceptable 
limits. 
 
Lastly, future practical implications of the presented analysis 
in terms of recommended LOM settings as well as some other 
utility operational aspects are included in a separate section. 
2  The need for change 
The Facilitation of Renewables (FOR) [1] study, published in 
2010 by Eirgrid and SONI showed that during times of high 
wind generation following the loss of the single largest 
credible contingency, ROCOF values of greater than 0.5 Hz/s 
could be experienced on the island of Ireland power system. 
In such a scenario the LOM protection currently employed by 
DG connected to the NIE Networks’ distribution system will 
operate disconnecting a large quantum of generation from the 
system.  In an already turbulent scenario this would further 
exacerbate system instability. 
 
Moreover, operational experience has caused NIE Networks 
to consider the stability of LOM protection, specifically 
Vector Shift.  On the 22nd of March 2013 Northern Ireland 
was exposed to a severe snow storm which resulted in a 
significant number of faults on the distribution and 
transmission system.  During three 15 minute blocks, 24 wind 
farms disconnected from the electricity system due to the 
activation of their LOM protection, totalling approximately 
316 MW of lost generation from the system over a 15 h 
period and a total of 171 MW in a single 15 minute period. 
 
The post fault analysis concluded that the wind farms which 
disconnected from the system were only those with the VS 
element of their LOM protection activated, whilst the wind 
farms with ROCOF protection employed remained stable. 
 
Consequently, NIE Networks decided to commission 
Strathclyde University to determine appropriate LOM settings 
to ensure system integrity during major system events. 
Suitable (stability ensuring) setting values had to be 
established for ROCOF and VS protection, as well as 
frequency and voltage protection. 
 
To achieve this, a detailed analysis of the selected worst-case 
scenario system-wide frequency profiles has been undertaken. 
Those profiles had been obtained from dynamic simulations 
and correspond to various critical transmission system 
incidents in Ireland, as summarised in Table 1. These critical 
profiles were provided by SONI in digital form as three phase 
voltage waveforms sampled at 10 kHz, suitable as an input to 
a dynamic relay model or hardware injection into a physical 
device. 
 
Moreover, a few faults records (captured during actual 
network incidents) were available which gave an additional 
real event based insight into the LOM protection performance 
in the vicinity of a fault. A summary of the utilised records is 
presented in Table 2. 
 
 
Event 
No 
Short description 
1 Frequency drop without fault 
2 Frequency drop with fault 
3 Frequency drop with fault 100ms, 50% retained voltage 
4 Frequency drop with fault 100ms, 5% retained voltage 
5 Frequency rise without fault 
6 Frequency rise with fault 
7 Frequency rise with fault 100ms, 50% retained voltage 
8 Frequency rise with fault 100ms, 5% retained voltage 
9 Loss of largest infeed high ROCOF scenario 
10 Loss of largest outfeed typical scenario 
11 Loss of largest infeed typical scenario 
12 High frequency with fault (100ms, 50% retained voltage) 
13 High frequency with fault (100ms, 5% retained voltage) 
14 Low frequency with fault (100ms, 50% retained voltage) 
15 Low frequency with fault (100ms, 5% retained voltage) 
Table 1: Simulated records of major system events 
 
Event 
No 
Short description Voltage 
level 
Date 
16 Line fault (3-phase),  
downstream partial loss of load 
110 kV 05/07/2015 
17 Voltage dip (3-phase) 220 kV 08/10/2014 
18 Voltage dip (3-phase) 110 kV 29/01/2015 
19 Line disconnected - no fault 
detected 
220 kV 14/03/2015 
20 Unclassified 220 kV 29/01/2016 
Table 2: Fault records of actual incidents 
2.1 Stability of ROCOF protection 
In the first step, each simulated record (events 1 to 20) was 
repeatedly processed by the validated dynamic ROCOF relay 
model [2] at different time delay settings. At each time delay 
the ROCOF setting of the relay was gradually increased from 
a small value to a point where the relay no longer operated. 
This way the minimum stability settings were established 
experimentally. To further verify these model-based results a 
few selected records have also been injected into the physical 
relay (MiCOM P341) and the stability limit has been 
established in the same way. The results related to simulated 
records (events 1 to 15) are presented in Figure 1, whereas the 
results based on the records of actual faults are shown in 
Figure 2. It needs to be noted that for clarity purposes the 
figures only include the highest ROCOF values (across all 
events) presented as a single characteristic (separately for 
“Relay model” and “Hardware relay”). Any ROCOF setting 
above these curves guarantees stability under all analysed 
events, while any setting below the curves may result in 
spurious tripping of ROCOF protection. Additionally, the 
figures include a depiction of the existing recommended 
setting of 0.4 Hz/s (with no additional delay), and four 
proposed alternative setting recommendations, all of which 
would ensure stability under the given critical event 
scenarios. These four alternative settings are suggested for the 
subsequent risk assessment. 
 
 
Figure 1: Proposed ROCOF setting options mapped against 
established stability settings (simulated events 1-15) 
 
 
Figure 2: Proposed ROCOF setting options mapped against 
stability settings obtained from system faults (16-20) 
 
It can be clearly seen that the existing setting (indicated as red 
triangle in Figure 2) cannot guarantee stability of ROCOF 
protection under the anticipated system dynamics. 
Additionally, four alternative ROCOF settings have been 
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proposed for risk assessment analysis (indicated by green 
diamonds in Figure 2). 
2.2 Stability of Vector Shift protection 
Subsequently, the same 20 events were used to assess the 
stability of the VS protection using similar methodology. The 
minimum angle setting values to ensure VS relay stability are 
presented in Figure 3 for simulated records 1 to 15, and in 
Figure 4 for fault recorder based events 16 to 20. 
 
It should be noted that the marginal settings for VS stability 
obtained from the simulated events 1 to 15 are generally very 
low, and therefore, do not seem to pose any stability issues. 
Under the MiCOM P341 relay minimum setting of 2q only 
record No 12 resulted in relay tripping. However, the relay 
did not trip when the setting was changed to 3q. From those 
results it would seem that VS relay has a very good immunity 
to critical system wide events, even to those with very high 
ROCOF values. 
 
To further investigate the apparent good stability of VS 
protection, the available fault records (events 16 to 20) were 
used. Due to past experience of spurious tripping of a number 
of VS relays during storm conditions in Ireland, it was 
important to verify whether such spurious tripping could have 
been initiated by transmission system faults. The minimum 
VS stability settings based on the five available records are 
presented in Figure 4, both obtained from the relay model and 
from hardware injection. These results clearly demonstrate 
that the VS tripping at the current recommended setting of 6q 
is very much possible during transmission system faults. On 
some occasions relay operation can be expected with settings 
up to 12q. However, it is understood that VS relay spurious 
tripping under transmission system faults does not have the 
same system-wide effect as frequency swings can have on 
ROCOF protection, and therefore, are less threatening to 
transmission system integrity. Nevertheless, it is considered 
important to explore the risk of possible increase in VS 
setting to improve security. Thus, two setting options of 6q 
and 12q are considered in risk analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: VS minimum settings to ensure LOM protection 
stability under simulated system events (1-15) 
 
Figure 4: VS minimum settings to ensure LOM protection 
stability under actual fault records (16-20) 
3 LOM protection sensitivity and risk 
assessment 
The risk assessment methodology applied in this work is 
based on a statistical analysis of a potential undetected 
islanding incidents, and the use of probability tree depicting 
the perceived hazards. Those hazards include personal safety 
(represented by probability tree in Figure 5a), and generator 
damage resulting from out-of-phase reclosure (Figure 5b).  
 
 
a) personal safety hazard 
 
b) generator damage hazard 
 
Figure 5. LOM safety hazard probability tree 
 
Due to space limitations of the conference publication this 
paper reports on one part of the risk assessment study only, 
related to generation up to 5 MW of installed capacity termed 
as Small Scale Generation (SSG). Similar approach has been 
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used to assess Large Scale Generation (LSG) (i.e. with 
installed capacities above 5 MW). The key assumptions of 
this study can be summarised as follows: 
 
x Generation output is represented by an example 
measured generation profile characteristic of a particular 
generation technology. 
x Two fundamental islanding scenarios have been 
considered: S1 – DG islanding through loss of supply to 
a primary substation, and S2 – DG islanding due to loss 
of individual 11 kV (or 6.6 kV) feeder. 
x Based on the NIE Networks’ DG protection setting 
records it was assumed that the usage of ROCOF 
protection (i.e. percentage of generators having ROCOF 
relay installed) is 33%, 10% and 12% for Synchronous 
(SM), inverter connected (IC), and induction machine 
(IM) based generation respectively. Regarding VS 
protection the assumed percentages were as follows: 
67% (SM), 90% (IC) and 88% (IM). 
x Detailed distribution of DG sizes in each scenario S1 
and S2, numbers, predominant groupings, as well as 
percentage contributions of individual generating 
technologies within the groups (generation mixes) were 
obtained from the available NIE Networks DG 
connection registers. 
x It is assumed that the generator (or a group of 
generators) does not continue to supply the system after 
an out-of-phase auto-reclosing operation. 
x A period of ஺ܶோ௠௔௫ = 30 s was assumed as the 
maximum expected time of operation of the auto-
reclosing scheme (i.e. regardless of load/generation 
balance, undetected stable island will not continue to 
operate longer than ஺ܶோ௠௔௫  due to the impact of out-of-
phase reclosure). 
x The LOM event is simulated as a simple opening of a 
circuit breaker at the point of common coupling and no 
initiating fault is simulated prior to islanding (worst-case 
scenario from the LOM detection perspective). 
 
Various elements of the probability tree in Figure 5 have been 
calculated as follows: 
 
Average annual number of loss of grid incidents at an 
individual islanding point is estimated from the utility 
network incident records using formula (1) 
 ௅ܰைீ,ଵூ௉ = ௡ಽೀಸ௡಺ುڄ்ಽೀಸ   (1) 
 
where ݊௅ைீ  is the total number of loss of supply incidents 
experienced during the period of ௅ܶைீ in a population of ݊ூ௉ 
islanding points. 
 
Probability ଶܲଷ = ଶܲ ר ଷܲ that the output of an individual DG 
group is balanced with local load (both P&Q) within the 
LOM protection non-detection zone (NDZ) for a period 
longer than ேܶ஽௓௠௔௫ is calculated by accumulating the 
periods of time ȟݐଵ ȟݐ௡ when daily network demand profile 
matches DG output which the margin of NDZ.  
 
Figure 6. Assessing probability of load-generation match 
 
Ten example recorded load profiles have been used as well as 
example recorded generation profiles representing wind, 
biomass and solar energy generation. The final result is 
obtained by averaging the outcomes of all utilised load 
profiles. 
 
NDZ depends on the islanded generation technology (or mix 
of technologies), generator control mode, and LOM 
protection type and settings. For each identified generation 
mix (11 mixes were considered based on DG connection 
register as indicated in Table 3), for each considered LOM 
protection option has been established by simulating loss of 
grid events at various degrees of generation/load imbalance 
(both P&Q) and testing LOM protection response as 
predetermined setting (8 LOM setting options were 
considered as shown in Table 4). 
 
Grouping 
Type Generation Mix 
Single 
1 (SM 100%) 
2 (IC 100%) 
3 (IM 100%) 
Groups of 2 
4 (SM 80%, IC 20%) 
5 (SM 50%, IC 50%) 
6 (SM 70%, IM 30%) 
7 (SM 30%, IM 70%) 
8 (IC 60%, IM 40%) 
9 (IC 20%, IM 80%) 
Groups of 3 10 (SM 50%, IC 15%, IM 35%) 
11 (SM 25%, IC 20%, IM 55%) 
Table 3. Assumed generation groupings (mixes) 
 
For each generation mix the expected total annual number of 
undetected loss of grid incidents is calculated using the 
following formula (2). 
 ௅ܰைெ = ௅ܰைீ ,ଵூ௉ ڄ ଶܲଷ ڄ ݊஽ீீ ڄ ݌௅ைெ ڄ ܮܨ   (2) 
 
Finally, the fatal personal injury risk ܫܴா and the risk of out-
of-phase reclosure ைܰ஺ are calculated using formulas  
(3) and (4) 
 ܫܴா = ௅ܰைெ ڄ ௉ܲாோ,ா     (3) ைܰ஺ = ௅ܰைெ ڄ ஺ܲோ    (4) 
 
} non-detection zone 
Time [h] 24 
P [MW] 
10 
20 
30 
load profile 
generation 
profile 
Risk of undetected island 
't1 't2 't3 't4 
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where ௉ܲாோ,ா is the probability of a person being in close 
proximity to an undetected islanded part of the system and 
suffering a fatal injury at the same time, and ஺ܲோ  is the 
probability of an out-of-phase auto-reclosing action following 
the disconnection of a circuit or a substation. A value of ஺ܲோ = 0.8 was assumed, while ௉ܲாோ,ா was calculated 
assuming exponential risk distribution following an 
undetected islanding event of ௅ܶைெ௔௩௥  duration. 
 ௉ܲாோ,ா = 0.05 ڄ (1 െ ݁ିଷ.ଷହ଴ଵ×ଵ଴షరڄ்ಽೀಾೌೡೝ)   (5) 
 
The values of the constants in formula (5) were established 
based on the existing incident statistics. 
 
The resulting risk can be then compared with the general 
criteria for risk tolerability included in the Health and Safety 
at Work Act 1974 [3] which adopts the risk management 
principle often referred to as the ‘ALARP’ or ‘As Low as 
Reasonably Practicable’ principle. The ALARP region 
applies for individual risk levels between 10ି଺ and 10ିସ. 
Risks with probabilities below 10ି଺ can generally be deemed 
as tolerable. 
 
The final summary results for the existing and potential future 
LOM options are included in Table 4. It can be seen that the ܫܴா risk values fall within the ALARP region which calls for 
additional mitigating measures in an attempt to reduce the 
perceived risks. Those are discussed in the following section. 
 
LOM 
Option 
LOM 
Setting 
[Hz/s] 
or [q] 
Time 
Delay  
[s] 
Individual risk of electrocution ࡵࡾࡱ ࢀࡱ [years] 
1 0.4 0 1.42E-05 7.03E+04 
2 2.0 0.2 1.66E-05 6.03E+04 
3 1.5 0.3 1.66E-05 6.03E+04 
4 1.5 0.5 1.66E-05 6.03E+04 
5 1.0 0.8 1.65E-05 6.07E+04 
6 6 - 2.39E-05 4.18E+04 
7 12 - 2.39E-05 4.18E+04 
8 - - 4.05E-05 2.47E+04 
 
Risk of out-of-phase reclosure ࡺࡻ࡭ ࢀࡻ࡭ [years] 
1 0.4 0 2.27E-02 44.10 
2 2.0 0.2 2.64E-02 37.83 
3 1.5 0.3 2.64E-02 37.83 
4 1.5 0.5 2.64E-02 37.83 
5 1.0 0.8 2.63E-02 38.07 
6 6 - 3.81E-02 26.22 
7 12 - 3.81E-02 26.22 
8 - - 6.46E-02 15.49 
Table 4. Risk figures obtained through load profile averaging 
 
Where: ܫܴா - annual probability related to individual risk (injury or 
death of a person) from the energised parts of an 
undetected islanded network ாܶ  - average duration between incidents (injury or death 
of a person) from the energised parts of an 
undetected islanded network [in years] 
ைܰ஺ - annual rate of occurrence of any generator being 
subjected to out-of-phase auto-reclosure during the 
islanding condition not detected by LOM protection ைܶ஺ - average duration between the occurrences of out-of-
phase auto-reclosure during the islanding condition 
not detected by LOM protection [in years] 
4 Key practical implications  
4.1 Risk based decision making 
Since the individual risk of electrocution resides within the 
ALARP region, NIE Networks requested that risk mitigation 
measures be assessed; namely, the presence of Neutral 
Voltage Displacement (NVD) protection and the reduction of 
the associated operating time from 10s1 down to 7s for SSG. 
 
It was identified that the presence of NVD protection would 
offer a risk of electrocution reduction of c76% for LSG and 
c32% for SSG. Moreover, it was identified that reducing the 
NVD operating from 10s to 7s would present a further 3.05% 
risk reduction for SSG. 
 
With the inclusion of NVD protection the proposed settings 
for LSG reside on the ALARP boundary i.e. 1.36 ڄ 10ି଺.  
Giving the significant system benefit in amending LOM 
settings NIE Networks determined it appropriate to proceed, 
from a risk perspective, with setting amendments to LSG. 
 
The risk of electrocution associated with SSG is significantly 
higher than LSG, and therefore, at the time of writing this 
paper no decision had been made regarding the amendment of 
SSG LOM settings.  
4.2 Future Proofing 
By including both connected and committed to connect 
generation within the generation database an element of 
future proofing was included in the risk analysis. However, it 
was identified that in some areas of the network where 
demand and generation balancing is not prevalent the future 
risk of islanding may increase.  To safeguard against this, NIE 
Networks will reassess the risks in the next regulatory period 
to determine if a material change has occurred and will 
propose mitigation measures at that time.  In the interim, NIE 
Networks will investigate measures to reduce the risk of 
electrocution and out-of-phase reclosure, with particular focus 
on SSG whose risks are significantly higher than LSG.   
4.3 Cost Benefit Analysis 
Before a decision could be made regarding the amendment of 
LOM settings a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) must be 
performed showing a net benefit to the customer. 
 
NIE Networks anticipate that, upon request, all required 
generators will have the capability to change the settings in 
                                                          
1
 NIE Networks standard NVD operating time for LV connected generation. 
their existing G59 relays to those proposed within this 
document. This scenario was therefore referred to as the 
expected scenario.  However, it is possible that some relays 
may not be able to be amended to the recommended settings 
and therefore require a new relay to be fitted; to reflect this 
scenario a worst-case scenario contingency has been included 
which assumes that 50% of LSG and SSG require a new 
LOM protection relay to be fitted.  Based on engagement with 
industry NIE Networks has estimated the expected scenario 
costs and worst-case scenario costs to be approximately 
€0.56m and €1.32m respectively. 
 
The main benefit of amending LOM settings will be reduced 
Single Electricity Market (SEM) wholesale costs.  It has been 
identified that if the new ROCOF standard can be 
implemented on the island of Ireland, SEM wholesale costs 
may be reduced by €13m per annum.  It can also be seen that 
an expected 4.4% reduction in wind curtailment levels may be 
realised in 2020 whilst an additional 1.5% towards the RES-E 
target of 40% by 2020 may be achieved [4]. 
 
Other, non-quantifiable benefits will be realised through the 
implementation of the new LOM settings. NIE Networks is 
aware that under remote fault scenarios the LOM protection 
of some generators may operate, resulting in the 
disconnection of the generator from the electricity network. 
This phenomenon has been referred to as nuisance tripping by 
industry and results in a loss of revenue to the generator 
owner. A benefit of implementing the proposed LOM 
protection amendments will be that LOM protection will be 
less susceptible to nuisance tripping resulting in less 
interruptions to generator supplies.  
 
It can, therefore, be seen that the cumulative benefits of 
amending generator LOM protection significantly outweigh 
the cost of implementation, even in the worst-case scenario. 
5 Conclusions 
The paper has presented a methodology, experience and 
practical outcomes of the risk assessment-based revision of 
LOM protection settings in NIE Networks’ distribution 
system. The LOM protection stability was first considered, 
providing strong motivation for change, followed by the 
protection sensitivity analysis and assessment of the resulting 
risks. The increase in both personal and out-of-phase 
reclosure risks have been realistically quantified and 
compared against the Health and Safety requirements.  
 
As the risk results fell within the ALARP safety margins 
additional risk mitigating measures were sought, including the 
application of NVD protection, as well as the NVD operation 
time reduction. 
 
Furthermore, a cost benefit analysis performed by NIE 
Networks has demonstrated clear financial benefit of the 
LOM protection settings adjustment. 
 
The results and observations included in the paper aim to 
provide the means and supporting evidence for achieving best 
compromise settings in the revision of LOM protection. 
 
Although future proofing of the risk assessment outcomes has 
been considered, it needs to be noted that in the dynamically 
changing system, including the ongoing revision of other DG 
related recommendations, the risk analysis may need to be 
revisited at some point to reflect those changes. 
 
Nevertheless, the authors believe that the presented 
systematic methodology and associated practical results 
provide a useful analytical framework for tacking various 
aspects of power system operation, and can be helpful in 
shaping various aspects of future grid regulation. 
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